Which president dealt with the iran contra affair

Contrary evidence or arguments be damned. To ensure that the administration was not emboldened to invest more resources into the fight, Congress approved a third Boland Amendment.

The exceptions helped the administration, but not much. Reagan believed that more had to be done, and soon. He flatly refused to admit defeat. If he could not rely on government agencies to accomplish the objective, he mulled over a novel option: The use of private organizations to fund the Contras.

In short, the administration would outsource a portion of its foreign policy. That such an end run around Congress violated the spirit of the law, or that such circumvention created a dangerous precedent for subsequent cases of executive overreach, mattered little to a presidential administration in the heat of a partisan battle.

Recognizing that time was of the essence, North reached out to the CIA director, William Casey, to provide intelligence to the Contras as well as arrange for training in military tactics. North also arranged back-channel deals for the Contras to purchase covert arms supplied by countries outside of the United States.

One promising method was to approach American allies for support. The United States, a wealthy nation, did not customarily meet with allies to ask for money, but desperate times called for desperate measures.

The Saudis were generous, initially supplying a million dollars a month, and eventually increasing their contribution. In the meantime, Oliver North, ostensibly acting under the auspices of an ambiguously named non-profit organization, the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty NEPL , made the rounds among wealthy private donors in the United States.

He developed a polished pitch that generated dollars and controversy. North was unfazed. He explained to all who would listen that he and the administration had complied fully with the terms of the Boland Amendment. Congress could prohibit funding for the Contras, but foreign policy was well within the purview of the executive branch. North also stumbled upon a means of funneling money to the Contras from Iran.

At first blush, it seemed an odd choice. Yet the Reagan administration recognized the advantages in dealing with Iran behind the scenes while publicly continuing the American policy of treating the regime as anathema. Iran desperately needed arms as well as spare parts for its mostly American-made weaponry. The administration recognized an opportunity.

If armaments could be transferred surreptitiously to Iran, the money from the sales could be channeled to the Contras.

It was a creative means of circumventing American law without attracting undue public or congressional attention. During the summer of , Bud McFarlane wrote a national security decision directive calling for improved relations with Iran to prevent Teheran from acquiring military assistance from the Soviet Union.

The directive allowed the United States government to sell military equipment to Iran. The plan was predicated on the possibility that a moderate faction existed within the Iranian government.

This was a difficult position for the Reagan administration to take without appearing hypocritical. When Reagan was campaigning for president in , the candidate bitterly criticized the Democratic incumbent, Jimmy Carter. Carter was president when the Iranian revolution occurred, and the Khomeini regime captured Americans inside the United States embassy. The ongoing hostage crisis showed how weak President Carter was, and Reagan continually blasted the administration for not adopting a tougher stance against Iran.

If he were elected, Reagan would be a strong commander in chief, refusing to kowtow to foreign thugs. During a Reagan administration, the United States would not suffer such indignities. Reagan won the White House in a landslide.

In public, he continued his hard line against Khomeini, repeatedly insisting that the United States would never negotiate with terrorists. Unlike his predecessor, this new president would not become yet another victim to a hostage crisis. Unfortunately for Reagan, Iranian-sponsored terrorists kidnapped Americans and held them hostage despite his bellicose rhetoric.

Nothing as dramatic as the storming of the American embassy occurred, but Iranian-backed terrorist groups such as Hezbollah kidnapped hostages one at a time with apparent impunity. Clearly a tough stance alone did not solve the problem. When he heard personal stories of how the hostages were treated, Reagan expressed genuine concern.

He longed for a means of securing their release without appearing to give in to terrorists. Perhaps members of the administration could forge a path forward by linking all these foreign policy problems together. Building off its relationship with Israel, the Reagan administration arranged a convoluted scheme to rely on intermediaries.

The United States would ensure that Israel acquired arms that would be supplied to Manucher Ghorbanifar, an Iranian arms dealer and former secret policeman. In theory, Ghorbanifar would then supply the arms to the moderate Iranians, who would use the weapons in the civil war with Iraq. In return, Iran would pressure Hezbollah, the terrorist group that had kidnapped seven American hostages, to release them from captivity. Aside from violating the policy of not negotiating with terrorists, the proposal was risky.

Nothing guaranteed success. Terrorist groups could not be trusted to honor their promises and release the hostages. Even if they did, nothing prevented them from seizing new hostages a week later.

If the United States government made the necessary overtures, Reagan believed that Rafsanjani would respond in kind. Administration officials had no doubt that Rafsanjani could order Hezbollah to produce the hostages. Whether Rafsanjani was genuine in his willingness to work with the Americans or was feigning good faith remains an open question to this day. The United States completed its first arms sale to Iran as early as , but most transactions occurred from August through October , for a total of nine exchanges.

After the first sale, Bud McFarlane resigned as national security adviser, citing his desire to spend more time with his family. His successor, Admiral John Poindexter, came into office just as the administration modified its arms-for-hostages scheme.

In lieu of working with the moderate civilian faction in Iran, the Reagan administration, still using Israel as an intermediary, tried to ensure that Iranian army officers received the arms.

Aside from Schultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger staunchly rejected the plan and its rationale. Reagan went ahead, though. The plan soon entered a new phase, with a new lead character at the helm.

As soon as McFarlane resigned, Oliver North, still struggling to arrange financing for the Contras, offered a new plan. Rather than supplying arms to Iran through Israel, the sales should be made directly to the Iranian regime. The United States could insist on a price markup as well.

North had been searching for funding to assist the Contras without directly violating the Boland Amendment, with limited success.

Now, he thought he saw a way to accomplish multiple goals simultaneously. If funds from the Iranian arms sales could be diverted to assist the Contras, the administration would be well positioned to free the hostages in the Middle East and combat Marxism in Latin America.

Admiral Poindexter, as the new national security adviser, might have halted the arrangement. Bud McFarlane was out of office, and a new man could have modified the plan, possibly convincing Reagan to find a safer, less risky alternative. Instead of reining in North, however, Poindexter provided his assistant with increased discretionary authority in the arms-for-hostages deal. Imbued with more power and responsibility than most lieutenant colonels possess, North charged forward, directing the scheme with virtually no oversight.

Reagan had established general priorities, but the president did not know about the operational specifics. The lack of knowledge about the details gave Reagan plausible deniability if the operation failed. For their part, the Iranians initially scoffed at the suggested price markup for the armaments, but they could not hold out indefinitely. The Iranian army sorely needed the weapons.

A lot of the mature adults—experienced prosecutors who were working for him—left, and the quality and experience level, and the nonpartisanship of his staff, changed over time. It went from well-respected former prosecutors and major law firm partners, people who did not have any identifiable political affiliation or bias and were respected members of the Bar, and became staffed by people who were either partisan or less experienced.

Max Friedersdorf Assistant to the President and Legislative Strategy Coordinator : I think [Iran-Contra] was another case of overzealousness, would be my interpretation of it. The administration was so anxious to help the Contras and to help them regain their country and defeat the Sandinistas that we were trying to figure out ways to get around—Congress would not appropriate any money for us to give them aid; they blocked it through amendments. We can do a third-country transfer.

I thought it was pretty bright myself, to be honest with you. But there are different interpretations that we did violate the law. I think the President probably was not tuned in to the details on it. I think [John] Poindexter and Bud McFarland and Ollie North ran the operation and the President was just probably aware—he was very pro Contra, of course—that he was telling them get it done and spare me the details. But there was so much heat from the Hill that about anything you did to help them was going to be controversial.

James F. We know what the President did. In his way, he approved the arms sales to Iran, but in his mind that was justified because we had a way of dealing with moderates there in opening up Iran and trying to make headway in that area of the world with the Middle East. So he thought it was a step in the right direction. But at the same time he was driven by getting the hostages back.

This was an opening with Iran, in dealing with a new element there and possible new leadership. If we got the hostages back because of it, then so be it. If it made more inroads with Iran, so be it. However, Reagan had absolutely no idea that from the arms sales, that money was being diverted to Central America, to the Contras. He had absolutely no idea. He was stunned when he found out.

They had come into the second administration, and they had no idea how he thought or how he worked. Reagan tends to trust people who work for him. Some people have their own best interests at heart. But all those people were gone. Frederick J. Ryan assistant to the President of the United States : The first request from independent counsel was to have Ronald Reagan come back to Washington.

They wanted to do the whole thing at the courthouse. He is now Solicitor General. Ted Olson and I and others felt that that was neither the right venue nor the right scene for a former President to testify in Federal court. An arrangement was made—actually, this came up two times. Once was the Poindexter trial, and once was when independent counsel wanted to depose President Reagan.

At the Poindexter trial an agreement was made. President Reagan sat down the day before with Ted Olson and talked about the facts. You are a witness in the trial. It was not a lawyer-like deposition. Unfortunately, it was taped, and the tape was played over and over again. It was hours long. They showed him photos and documents. I think it was out of context and after asking a lot of detailed questions about Contras and things like that.

There was a second one where they wanted him to come back to Washington and the independent counsel again wanted him to come to the Federal courthouse. It would be an interview with a court reporter there. The funny thing was that the independent counsel came out.

Ryan: Walsh came out first, and they had a lot of negotiations about where it would take place and who could be in the room because of all the security issues involved.

It was finally agreed that President Reagan would be there. Ted Olson, his counsel, and I would be there as a lawyer. My clearance was still in place. Then he would have some people on his side. They sent people out to look at the room. The security people came in and did the windows so no photos could be taken in of the confidential documents, and they swept it for devices.

This nuclear assistance was part of a For many people in the United States, the late s were a troubled and troubling time. The radical and countercultural movements of the s and early s, the Watergate scandal, the Vietnam War, uncertainty in the Middle East and economic crisis at home had undermined The Persian Empire is the name given to a series of dynasties centered in modern-day Iran that spanned several centuries—from the sixth century B.

In the late s and early s, a virus that had previously appeared sporadically around the world began to spread throughout the United States. As with most anti-drug initiatives, Just Say No—which became an American catch phrase in the s—evoked both support and criticism from the public. The 80s Crack Live TV. This Day In History. History Vault. Recommended for you.

What Was the Iran-Contra Affair? Iran-Contra Affair. Iran-Iraq War. The s For many people in the United States, the late s were a troubled and troubling time. Polls showed that only 14 percent of Americans believed the president when he said he had not traded arms for hostages. Then-unknown Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North of the National Security Council explained the discrepancy: he had been diverting funds from the arms sales to the Contras, with the full knowledge of National Security Adviser Admiral John Poindexter and with the unspoken blessing, he assumed, of President Reagan.

Poindexter resigned, and North was fired, but Iran-Contra was far from over. The press hounded the president: Did he know about these illegal activities, and if not, how could something of this magnitude occur without his knowledge?

In an investigation by the Reagan-appointed Tower Commission, it was determined that, as president, Reagan's disengagement from the management of his White House had created conditions which made possible the diversion of funds to the Contras. But there was no evidence linking Reagan to the diversion.

Speculation about the involvement of Reagan, Vice President George Bush and the administration at large ran rampant. Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh investigated the affair for the next eight years. Fourteen people were charged with either operational or "cover-up" crimes. In the end, North's conviction was overturned on a technicality, and President Bush issued six pardons, including one to McFarlane, who had already been convicted, and one to Weinberger before he stood trial.