When was the strategic arms reduction treaty signed

See Status. Visit the Education Center. The U. President George H. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. It played an indispensable role in ensuring the predictability and stability of the strategic balance and serving as a framework for even deeper reductions.

At the same time, START I proved to be excessively complicated, cumbersome and expensive to continue, which eventually led the United States and Russia to replace it with a new treaty in In January , U.

Secretary of State George Schultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko agreed on a new formula for three-part negotiations that encompassed strategic weapons, intermediate-range forces and missile defense.

These talks received a significant boost at the Reykjavik summit between Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. Negotiations subsequently turned to the reduction of strategic weapons. The break-up of the Soviet Union in December and the need to make arrangements with regard to its nuclear inheritance contributed to a three-year delay between the signing of the treaty and its entry into force.

According to that agreement, four post-Soviet states — Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine — were recognized as parties to START I in place of the Soviet Union, but only Russia was designated a nuclear weapon state, while the other three assumed an obligation to join the NPT as non-nuclear states and eliminate all START I accountable weapons and associated facilities within seven years the period of reductions mandated by the treaty. Although the entry into force of START I took more than three years, some important activities were conducted shortly after its signing, most notably exchange of data on strategic weapons and associated facilities, as well as inspections to verify data on technical characteristics of strategic missiles and implementation of provisions on test launches and telemetry exchanges.

Reductions mandated by the treaty were to be completed no later than seven years after its entry into force. Parties were then obligated to maintain those limits during the next eight years.

The Moscow Treaty provided for significantly lower limits on strategic weapons, but lacked verification and transparency provisions. It contained the option of extending the treaty for five-year periods, but Washington and Moscow decided against extension — negotiations were already underway on a new, replacement treaty, and START I was allowed to expire. START I established an aggregate limit of 1, delivery vehicles and 6, warheads for each party a reduction from , warheads in The Treaty also established a limit of 3, metric tons t for the throw-weight of ballistic missiles.

The construction of new types of heavy ICBMs and SLBMs is banned, although modernization programs and, in exceptional cases, new silo construction, are permitted.

The treaty bans the testing of missiles equipped with a greater number of warheads than established in the treaty, and bans any new ballistic missiles with more than 10 warheads. Parties to the treaty may also reduce the number of warheads attributed to a specific missile.

However, no more than three existing missile types may have the number of warheads reduced, and the total reduction may not exceed 1, warheads. While the treaty counts each ICBM and SLBM reentry vehicle as a single warhead, counting rules for warheads attributed to heavy bombers are more complicated. Each Russian heavy bomber equipped to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs defined as having maximum range of km or more , up to a total of bombers, counts as eight warheads toward the 6, warhead limit, even though existing Russian heavy bomber types can carry between six and 16 ALCMs.

Each Russian heavy bomber above the level of has its actual number of ALCMs counted toward the 6, warhead limit. Similarly, each U. At their September summit meeting in Moscow, Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton reiterated yet again their pledges to push for further reductions of strategic nuclear weapons, but were unable to report any concrete steps toward the ratification of START II by the Russian Duma.

Meeting with his U. Under its terms, the deadline for dismantling the strategic delivery systems slated for elimination under START II would be extended from to This provision would allow Russia to spread out the cost of destroying its multiple-warhead land-based ICBMs, addressing the cost concerns of some Russian parliamentarians. This proposed treaty, with its lower warhead ceiling, would save Russia the expense of building several hundred new single-warhead land-based missiles to match US force levels under START II.

The Protocol and letters formally codified the agreement reached by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at the Helsinki Summit in March On 26 January, upon notification of the U. President Bill Clinton pledging to push the Russian parliament to ratify the Treaty before the G-7 Moscow summit on nuclear safety in April.

On 17 October, U. According to Russian and Western reports, Perry was accorded a cool reception and his speech failed to impress the Duma. Clinton and Yeltsin also stated that once START II was ratified, the United States and Russia were to deactivate the missiles slated for destruction under the Treaty by removing their warheads and removing them from alert status.

In the State of the Union address on 28 January, U. Yeltsin also declared that Russia had unilaterally terminated the production of its heavy bombers Tu and TuMS , as well as long-range air-launched cruise missiles ALCMs , and proposed renouncing the creation of new types of such missiles on a bilateral basis. He announced that Russia would no longer conduct exercises involving more than 30 heavy bombers, and had reduced by half the number of submarines with SLBMs on patrol. He proposed that Russia and the United States agree on detargeting their nuclear weapons.

On 5 October, responding to the initiatives proposed by U. The Soviet Union promised to unilaterally reduce its strategic nuclear weapons to 5, warheads instead of the 6, provided for under START I and proposed immediately, upon ratification of START I, to begin negotiations on reduction by half of the remaining strategic arsenals.

Explore the Center. From this point forward, the process of deactivating the LF took less than days. A series of agreements between the United States and the former Soviet Union allowed the weapons-grade nuclear material from the warheads to be either used for fuel in nuclear reactors or disposed of along with other high-level radioactive waste.

Hazardous materials were then removed from the site and contractors salvaged steel and other equipment. Destruction of the silos could be accomplished either by implosion to at least six meters twenty feet below ground level or by excavating the former silo to a depth of at least eight meters twenty-six feet.

The silo site then had to remain open for ninety days to allow Soviet satellites time to verify that the removal complied with treaty provisions. At the end of this time period the process was considered complete. You Might Also Like.